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ABSTRACT 
This study examines the impact of Andersen reputation on rnarket prices based on the event of Andersen 
admission of shredding documents related to the Enron audit in United States. Specifically, in this paper, we 
extend to the other stock exchange out of United States, namely Bursa Malaysia. Is there any contagious impact 
on Andersen reputation to the Bursa Malaysia? Since the admission announcement shows the issue of 
independence as the main focus in the Andersen case, this study also document the impact of non-audit fees on 
market reaction surrounding the admission announcement date. Interestingly, the results prevails a contagious 
impact on Andersen's Malaysia office due to the shredded reputation in the United States. However, 
Andersen's Malaysia office only suffered a less severe decline compared to Andersen's United States and 
Houston office. In addition, there is no evidence that Andersen's Malaysia independence was questionable. 
Keywords: Auditor Reputation, Auditor Independence, Market Prices 
INTRODUCTION 
Studies on auditor reputation have been discussed frequently in the accounting and auditing literatures. Such 
studies attempted to relate the audit reputation with audit fees, loan pricing and initial public offering (see for 
example, Francis and Simon, 1987; Betty, 1989; Butterworth and Houghton, 1995; Rose, 1999; Hartini, 2003). 
In addition, it is assumed that a reputable auditor also an independence auditor (De Angelo, 1981). Many 
people assume that larger audit firms, especially the Big Five 'firms, are more credible than the non-Big Five 
firms. Thus, they are presumed to perform more quality works than the non-Big Five. This phenomenon 
pretends to give value added to the wealth of companies. 
However, recently the Enron scandal in the United States caused the reputation and independence of the Big 
Five to be questionable. The history event happened when the Enron's auditor, Andersen, was heavily criticized 
for its collapse. After August 2002, Andersen was barred from conducting and reporting on the audits of SEC- 
registered companies. This is never happens in the history of auditing profession that such big firms are denied 
of its quality in that way. 
The Enron case caused the auditor's reputation severely tarnish to the extent that many companies' (Andersen's 
clients) share prices significantly dropped simply because investors loss confidence on the auditor's reports 
(Chaney and Philipich, 2002). However, Andersen (also lcnown as Arthur Andersen) was a multinational audit 
firms. The events occurred in the U.S may contagious to other nations due to the shredded reputation in the 
United States. Nevertheless, empirical study has to be carried out to confirm such contention. This paper 
attempts to carry out such study. 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
There were a lot of previous studies that addressed the issue of audit quality for large audit firms. It is suggested 
that large audit firms produce higher audit quality than the smaller audit firms (Lennox, 1999). Such qualities 
are recognized as market react positively when a company switches to a larger audit firms from a smaller one 
(Nicholas and Smith, 1983). 
Menon and Williams (1994) found that the disclosure of L&H's bankruptcy had an adverse effect on market 
prices of L&H clients. He used seasoned securities and initial public offering (IPO) loss as the determinant of 
Cumulative Abnormal Return (CAR). In addition, Green and Dawkins (2000) found that there was negative 
association between bankruptcy outcome and price reaction to bankruptcy filings. 
Similarly, Moreland (1995) in his study of the effects of SEC criticisms (sanctions) of auditors on earning 
response coefficients (ERC) of client firms, found that abnormal security returns is negatively affected by 
earning prices. This is also supported by study by Firth (1990) who found that United Kingdom of Trade (DOT) 
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investigations into the affairs of a specific company and their criticism on the auditors appear to incur economic 
losses from the damage of their reputations. 
A further study by Chaney and Philipich (2002) using Andersen's client shows that the cost of audit failure 
would affect and impaired audit reputation. The results show that on the three following days after Andersen's 
admission of a significant number of documents had been shredded; the Andersen's clients experienced a 
statistically negative market reaction. This suggested that investors downgraded the quality of audits performed 
by Andersen (Chaney and Philipich, 2002). Besides, they also found that the clients whose audit was performed 
by Andersen's Houston office suffered a more severe decline in abnormal returns on this date. Similarly 
Krishnamurthy, Zhou and Zhou (2002) found that the deterioration of Andersen's reputation was the worse after 
its criminal indictment on March 14, 2002 caused the market to react more negatively to Andersen clients than 
to clients of the other Big Four auditors. 
Besides concentrating and analyzing the effect of auditor reputation on market reaction of Andersen's clients, 
Chaney and Philipich (2002); Krishnamurthy el al. (2002) studied on the impact of non-audit services to the 
market prices. It is presumed that market react negatively to the larger non-audit services pwchased by 
Andersen's clients, which show that the auditor independence is impaired (Chaney and Philipich, 2002; and 
Krishnamurthy et al., 2002). However the results are mixed. Krishnamurthy et al. (2002) found that the 
abnormal return is significantly higher when auditor independence is perceived to be high. This is contrast to 
Chaney and Philipich (2002). The reason why this happens is because Krishnamurthy el al. (2002) used the date 
of Andersen criminal indictment on March 14, 2002 while Chaney and Philipich (2002) focused on the date of 
Andersen's admission that a significant number of documents had been shredded. Also, Chaney and Philipich 
(2002) uses sample which consisted relatively larger firms, whereas Krishnamurthy et al. (2002) sample 
consisted of many smaller firms. However, in general, both studies confirm that Andersen reputation was 
declined even different dates were used in their analysis. Therefore in this study, the date of Andersen's 
admission that a significant number of documents had been shredded will be analyzed using the regression 
analysis to ensure that the results can be concluded clearly. 
HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
The role of an auditor is to monitor a company. The monitoring mechanism is to ensure that managers act in 
accordance with owners' interests or to reduce agency costs such as increasing rate of managers' honest 
reporting and reduce the auditing demand by the owner (Chow, 1982; and Finley, Hopwood and Tucker, 1999). 
In addition, the reputation effect of an auditor will control the opportunistic value-reducing behaviow of the 
managers (Fama, 1980). This would happen in efficient competitive market (Fama, 1980). Thus, such 
reputation will protect the share price by adjusting the share prices accordingly (Watts and Zimmerrnan, 1986). 
In fact, the managers demand such quality of auditor to signal their honesty to the market (Jensen and Meckling, 
1976). Subsequently, the last resort is to protect the shareholder interest. However, when an audit fm is in the 
case of uncertainty such as bankruptcy or lawsuits, the companies will together bear this uncertainty. As 
suggested by Menon and Williams (1994), this situation will lead to future monitoring uncertainty and the 
prospect of a delay in the filing of audited financial statements. Both may create possible losses to the 
companies such as negative reaction of stock prices. 
In the light of the Andersen's Malaysia case, the negative market reaction might not be seen before the 
announcement of Enron's bankruptcy because probably investors in Malaysia still did not know this news. In 
fact, the contagious effect would not happen before a bad news is announced. The brand name of Andersen was 
tarnished around the world after Andersen admitted shredded the Enron's documents. Later, such brand name 
has not been used outside the United States after Andersen United States was barred from auditing the 
companies. They then tried to find other Big Four for merging and building a reputable brand name. The brand 
name and audit quality represent the reputation of the auditor and is the most important feature of an audit firm 
(Dopuch and Simunic, 1982). A repetition story of Andersen failure in the news and press worldwide may also 
portray an eroded reputation because an action was called to be taken to the Andersen by outsiders such as 
Securities Commission and public, We argued that it may results the investors outside United States to pull out 
the investment in Andersen clients. 
Evidence shows that deterioration in the audit quality of Andersen occurred no later than mid- 1990s compared 
to other Big-Five (Fuerman, 2003). What would happen that Andersen could not protect their liability from any 
legal regime in the world when the consequence of audit quality and audit failure were severe after they 
admitted shredded the documents even though Andersen was assumed providing a high audit quality to their 
clients (Kadous, 2000). Again, we expect that the Andersen United States reputation will also effect the 
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reputation of Andersen worldwide specifically Andersen Malaysia, hence, reflecting negatively in the share 
prices of its clients. 
Study by Callen and Morel (2002) proved that events directly related to Andersen had a larger (negative) impact 
on stock returns than events directly related to Enron. Therefore, in the case of events directly related to 
Andersen, it is expected that a negative reaction will be prevailed. In this present study, one event directly 
related to Andersen' United States that might be effect other Andersen around the world including Malaysia is 
studied. The date used is the announcement of shredding documents, which Andersen had admitted on Jan 10, 
2002. This announcement is the bad news to Andersen's clients. Event on Jan 10, 2002 was unexpected and 
was met with shock in the business community due to the fact that normally when audit firms paid damages to 
lawsuit claimants or penalties to the SEC, they are careful not to admit guilty (Chaney and Philipich, 2002). 
Subsequently, this will tarnish the Andersen reputation. As a result of the bad news, the Andersen's clients also 
affected. It is argued that the contagious impact will happen in Malaysia due to the fact that Malaysia is an open 
market nation and Andersen established its branches over here. However, the contagious impact would not 
spread to other Big Four because it only involved Andersen's reputation (Knshnamurthy et al., 2002). 
Therefore the following hypotheses are derived as follows (in alternate form): 
Hla: Andersen S clients in Malaysia will experience a negative market reaction to the announcement of 
news that Andersen admitted shredded documents related to the Enron audit, is madepublic. 
Hlb: Andersen S clients in Malaysia will experience a negative market reaction to the announcement oJnews 
that reflects negatively on the Andersen 's reputation. 
In addition, the negative abnormal returns could be driven by the Andersen independence. It is argued that 
audit firms provided other services rather the audits to some extend impair their independence. In the 
Andersen's case, the event that Andersen admitted shredded documents related to the Enron audit are likely 
impaired Andersen independence. This will be more prominent if Andersen perform more on other services 
rather than audit services. As the consequences, the reliability and validity of Andersen audit of their companies 
could be denied and questionable. Investors will belief that Andersen did not give the best opinion as "true and 
fair view" to their clients. Thus, the negative abnormal return would be larger if the auditor independence 
perceived to be impaired. 
H2: There is a positive relationship between audit fee ratio and abnormal return for events that perceived 
Andersen not to be independence. 
Consistent with the measurement used by Krishnamurthy et al. (2002), the measurement of Andersen 
independence is the ratio of audit fees to total fees. The reason this measurement is used because low audit fee 
ratio shows that the auditors provide large amounts of non-audit services, and therefore perceived to be not 
independent (Krishnamurthy et al. 2002). 
The sample comprised of all Andersen's clients in Malaysia in the year of 2000 and must still maintain 
engagement with Andersen until 2002. Total sample is 101 conpanies. For descriptive analysis, the date that 
Andersen admitted shredding the documents on January 10, 2002 is used. Ten trading days on stock prices of 
Bursa Malaysia (Main and Second board) are gathered (see Menon and Williams 1994). 
This study used previous established event study model. Fama, Fisher, Jensen and Roll (1969) pioneered the 
event study. Later, in 1980s, the researchers introduced the cross sectional studies using abnormal returns and 
firm specific variables of size and leverage (see Leftwich, 1981). Thus, this study replicates the established 
model of cumulative abnormal return from previous studies in market reaction of audit quality that is used 
worldwide in auditing literature (see for example, Menon and Williams, 1994; Chaney and Philipich, 2002; 
Krishnamurthy et al., 2002 in the United States; and in Asia, Gul, Sun and Tsui, 2003) and extended to 
accommodate the Malaysian environment. Several variables such as size and risk are control in the Ordinary 
Least Squares Regressions, are possible to influence market returns (see for example Menon and Williams, 
1994; Chaney and Philipich, 2002; and Krishnamurthy et al., 2002 in the United States; and in Asia Gul, Sun 
and Tsui, 2003). Both variables are well specified in the model (Leftwich, 1981). Size and risk are proxied by 
the natural log of total assets and debtttotal assets ratio (debt ratio). Size and risk provide a simple and powerful 
characterization of abnormal return in finance literature (Banz, 1981; and Farna and French, 1992). Both 
variables are powerful variables to explain Cumulative Average Return (CARS). Other variables ;sales growth 
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(SALESGROW), Andersen (AA) and financial year-end (FYR) are most likely to attribute the price movements 
within the window period, thus, affect the market return (Menon and Williams, 1994; Chaney and Philipich, 
2002; and Krishnamurthy e f  al., 2002 in the United States; and in Asia Gul, Sun and Tsui, 2003). Below are the 
detailed explanations of each variable that likely attribute the price movements within the window period, which 
may attribute to the contagious effects. 
This study uses one sample t-test and the regression analysis (OLS) to analyze the data. The research models 
are as follows: 
Andersen admitted shredding documents 
where, 
CAR= The Cumulative Mean Abnormal Return for Andersen client over the two, three and five days 





ARit = Abnonnal Return 
R ,  = Observed return on security I 
R,, =Return on the KLSE Composite Index (KLCI) for the f th period 
a = Intercept 
pi = Beta for firm I' 
FEERATIO = The ratio of audit fee to total fees paid to Andersen 
LOGASSETS = Loglo of total assets 
SALESGROW = Percentage growth in sales from 19999-2000 
LEV =The ratio of long-term debt plus short-term debt to total assets 
AA =Indicator variable having a value of 1, if the name of auditor is Andersen and 0, if Hanafiah 
Raslan Moharnad 
FYR =Indicator variable having a value of 1, if the fiscal year-end between December 3 1 
and 
January 3 1, and 0, if otherwise 
a= constant (i = 0) 
P =  Coefficients= i - 1,2,3,4,5 
RESULTS 
Descriptive Analysis 
Table 1 shows that how the sample is gathered. As suggested by Menon and Williams (1994), the companies 
must meet all the following criteria; first, the companies should have stock return data. Second, additional data 
in the analyses should be available; third, the trading price should at least RM0.25, and lastly, the companies 
should not make a dividend or earnings announcement on the ten trading days. In addition, all Practice Note 4 
companies are eliminated to ensure no compounded effect and also meet the Menon and Williams (1994) 
requirements. 
' Betas were estimated using a 100-day estimation period that ended December 3 1,2001 (refer to Menon and 
Williams, 1994). Composite Index of Bursa Malaysia was used to compute market returns. 
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Table 1 : Sample Selection: Andersen's clients in Bursa Malaysia 
Table 2 and Table 3 confirms that CARS for Andersen clients are significantly negative for two and three event 
windows. However, both abnormal returns and CARs are less severe compare to Andersen's counterpart in 
United States and Houston (see Chaney and Philipich, 2002). For example, on January 11 average abnormal 
returns for Andersen's clients in Malaysia are only -.3547 % compare to Andersen's clients in United States 
with -0.78%. Similarly, in Malaysia, CAR for two event windows (0, +1) is only -.7043%, while United States 
and Houston office are -1.17% and -3.16% respectively. Again, it is shows that Andersen's Malaysia office is 
less severe decline on this date. Overall, the results from Table 2 and Table 3 support Hypothesis 1 ( la  and lb). 
' Total Andersen's Clients 
Less 
Delisting companies 
Practice Note 4 companies 
Earning Announcement 
Dividend Announcement 
No Return Data 
No Annual Report 
Trading price below RM0.25 
Total Sample 
Companies that purchased Non-Audit Services (NAS) 
Companies that did not purchase NAS and disclose it in the annual reports 
Total Sample for regression analyses 
Companies that are silent on NAS (assumed did not purchase NAS) 
Total sample 
Table 2: Effect of Andersen Admitted Announcement of Shredded Documents on Security Prices of Andersen 


































I I I I 
* Significant at 10% (2-tailed) 
-1.647 
- 1.676* 
-1.730* Jan 14 
I I 
Table 3: Effect of Andersen Admitted Announcement of Shredded Documents on Security Prices of Andersen 









I I I I 
* Significant at 10% (2-tailed) 
-0.35 16 
Event Window I Cumulative Abnormal Retum (%) 
- 1.654 
t-test 
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Multivariate Regression Analysis 
Before using multivariate regression analysis, an analysis on multicollinerity was done. Table 4 shows that only 
LEV and LOGASSETS is positively associated at 0.01 levels. However, the coefficient between both variables 
is still acceptable (0.518). To ensure the multicollinerity does not pose serious problem to the multivariate 
regression analysis, variance inflation factors (VIF) are computed. Evidence exhibits that VIF are under 2. 
Therefore, it indicates that the multivariate regression analyses can be used to test the Hypothesis 2 with 
minimal multicollinerity problems. 
The purpose to use the mutivariate regression analysis is to test Hypothesis 2. If Hypothesis 2 is true, the issues 
of auditor independence, specifically Andersen's Malaysia must be worried. However, the results from Table 5 
do not support Hypothesis 2 for both event 'windows (two-day-window and three-day window). FEERATIO is 
insignificant although the sign is positive as expected. 
The coefficients for other variables are in the expected directions. However, only two variables are significant. 
AA and FYR have significantly negative associated to CARS at 0.05 levels (two-tailed test). AA is introduced 
in the analysis because Andersen was team up with the largest local audit fm of Hanafiah Raslan Mohamad 
(HRM). The market of audit firm in Malaysia is unique because most of the Big Five team up with local audit 
firm. Therefore, it is assumed that Andersen is more reputable compared to HRM but not after the shredded 
document scandal. This might due to the fact that international investors foresee the Andersen quality 
downgraded after the admission announcement of shredded document by Andersen. The negative coefficient 
confirms this contention. The variable FYR has a significantly negative coefficient and consistent with Menon 
Menon and Williams (1 994). 
The regression analysis of the two-day window does not much different with the three-day window. Adjusted 
R' for both event windows are 0.129 and 0.129, respectively, which is comparable with other studies (refer to 
Menon and Williams, 1994; Chaney and Philipich, 2002; Krishnamurthy eta]., 2002). Besides, both models are 
significant at 0.049 and 0.05 1. Further tests are also employed and the results still hold.' 
The results should be interpreted cautiously due to the fact that the declining share prices of Andersen's clients 
might not be solely necessarily because of the event involved with the shredded reputation of Andersen in 
United States. a he results might be clearer if we include non-Andersen clients as a control sample. However, 
due to unavoidable constraints, an analysis on the non-Andersen clients could not be conducted. 
There are two kinds of results that will be revealed for non-Andersen clients. First if the abnormal return and 
cumulative abnormal return for their clients are not significant, it shows clearly about the contagious effect. 
However, if the results are significant and similar with Andersen's clients, it shows that it is congruent with the 
efficient market hypothesis. Evidence reveals that the investors in Malaysia market follow the market 
sentiments (Noor and Wan, 2004). Thus, this gives a significant impact on non-Andersen clients because of the 
investors are so panic about the event happened in United States and the heavily criticisms on the audit quality 
of auditors including Big Five firms after the scandal involved Andersen. 
Although the research design does have such constraints, this study still provides some empirical evidence on 
insurance hypothesis theory using the stock prices. In fact, contagious effects can be expanded to other 
countries. There is some evidence shows that Andersen Malaysia reputation also affected by the shredded - 
reputation of Andersen US. But, in the case of Andersen Malaysia independence, there is no evidence that 
investors react negatively when Andersen Malaysia providing large non-audit services to their clients. 
' The non-audit fees ratios are used to replace audit fees ratios and the results still similar. 
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FYR -. 126 
*** Correlation is significant at 19 
LOGASSETS SALESGROW LEV AA FYR 
.I44 -.I61 .04 1 ,027 -.I26 
.5 18(* * *) -.O 14 
-.056 
.5 18(**) -. 154 
-.I17 
-.O 14 .007 .038 1 
(two-tailed). 
Table 5: Effect of Andersen Admitted Announcement of Shredded Documents on Security Prices of Andersen 
Clients in Malaysia- Regression of Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARS), N=54 
Variables I Expected Sign I Two-day window Three-day window 1 






I 2.310 I 2.292 I Fzt: F (Two-tailed test) 0.049 0.05 1 I 
FYR 
I I 







FEERATIO -  The ratio of audit fee to total fees paid to Andersen 
LOGASSETS -  Loglo of total assets 
SALESGROW - Percentage growth in sales from 19999-2000 
LEV - The ratio of long-term debt plus short-term debt to total assets 
AA - Indicator variable having a value of 1, if the name of auditor is Andersen 
and 0, if Hanafiah Raslan Mohamad 
FYR - Indicator variable having a value of 1, if the fiscal year-end between 
December 3 1 and January 3 1, and 0, if otherwise 
-.278 1 -2.1 14** 






This study provides evidences that Andersen's clients in Malaysia also react negatively with the issue of 
Andersen independence in the United States. These results should be interpreted with cautious because this 
doesn't mean that Andersen Malaysia was not independence. Malaysia market depends on United States thus 
what has happened in the United States would also impact Malaysia. In this study, the results show that a 
contagious impact on Andersen clients in Malaysia after what has happened in the United States. 
-.276 
Constant 
Some implications should be emphasized. The interests of the local investors need to be protected whenever 
event of audit scandals occur abroad and has no connection with the local market. Thus, policy makers should 
take a drastic step to ensure the independence of audit firms in Malaysia are not compromised because the 
investors have to bear the risk if the auditor independence is impaired. For example, recently Malaysian 
Institute of Accountants (MIA) has revised the MIA By Laws (on Professional Independence) and came into 
force starting July 2004. 









These findings are subject to several limitations. First, in terms of method, only one method was employed (one 
sample t-test). Results might be different if other methods such as corrected version of the Z-test is used. 
Second, the results for both abnormal return and cumulative abnormal return are weak with significant level at 






0.128 Adjusted R' 
.122 0 9 18
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only 10%. Lastly, this study does not coirtrol non-Andersen clients due to unavoidable constraints. Future 
research should emphasize and include this in the analysis, to ensure the clearer picture about the auditor 
reputation on market prices. 
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